This paper proposes a difference-in-differences strategy to decompose the contributions of various types of discrimination to the black-white wage differential. The proposed estimation strategy is implemented using data from the Young Physicians Survey. The results suggest that potential discrimination plays a small role in the racial wage gap among physicians. At most, discrimination lowers the hourly wages of black physicians by 3.3 percent. Decomposition shows that consumer discrimination accounts for all of the potential discrimination in the physician market, and that the effect of firm discrimination may actually favor black physicians. Interpretations of the estimates, however, are complicated by the possibility that, relative to white physicians, black physicians negatively self-select into self-employment.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the progress made in the last fifty years, the gap in earnings between blacks and whites remains significant today. Although there are a number of factors that may account for this difference in earnings, economists have traditionally focused on labor market discrimination as the cause of the inequity. The study of labor market discrimination was formalized by Becker's economic theory of discrimination (1957) in which discrimination against a particular group can originate from three sources: employers, coworkers, and consumers.
1 Becker outlines the conditions under which various forms of discrimination would result in wage disparities. Instead of isolating the effects of different types of discrimination, empirical studies ensuing Becker's analysis have largely focused on the total impact of discrimination on the earnings of minorities.
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Decomposition of discrimination, however, is crucial in targeting enforcement of antidiscrimination legislation, which is intended to mainly deter firm-based discrimination, but not necessarily acts driven by prejudicial attitudes of consumers.
In this paper, we develop a general framework in the spirit of Becker's work to isolate the effect of firm discrimination from that of consumer discrimination. The model is based on the insight that self-employed individuals are not subject to discrimination from firms and, therefore, any wage penalty experienced by salaried minority workers in excess of the wage penalty experienced by self-employed minority workers who belong to the same industry can be attributed to firm discrimination. The model, however, clarifies that this intuition is not generally correct unless a number of conditions are satisfied. Data from the Young Physicians Survey is used to quantify the size of the earnings differential between black and white physicians.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief review of preference-based theories of discrimination and thereby lays the foundations for the discussion of the model. 3 In Section III we introduce a simple model to decompose wage differentials associated with discrimination. The empirical implementation of the model is discussed in Section IV. In Section V, the data used in the statistical analysis is introduced and the empirical results are presented. The robustness of the results is checked in Section VI. Section VII concludes.
II. PREFERENCE-BASED THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION
In his seminal work, Becker defines discrimination as an unwillingness to be in the presence of people of a different race. Hence, a firm that has a "taste for discrimination"
would not pay a worker of a different race a wage commensurate to that worker's productivity. If we assume that only the majority may discriminate against others, then a discriminating majority employer would be willing pay a minority worker who generates a marginal product value of V a maximum wage of (1-D)V, where D represents the intensity of discrimination by the firm and its value is less than one. As a result of being underpaid relative to the level of productivity, the minority worker might be driven to work for a nondiscriminating firm, which is willing to offer the worker a wage higher than (1-D)V. If the number of nondiscriminating firms is sufficiently large in the market, this particular minority worker's wage is likely to be bid up to V, the true value of the worker, and any negative wage effects of discrimination would be completely undone. In general, if the number of nondiscriminating employers is large relative to the number of minority workers, or if the nondiscriminating firms have constant or increasing returns to scale technologies (which would allow the nondiscriminating firms to expand and hire a large number of minority workers), then minority workers may not be affected by discrimination at all. In other words, the prejudicial attitude of some of the firms may or may not cause minority workers to earn lower wages than their majority counterparts 3 In models such as Becker's, personal prejudice is the driving force for differences in observed labor market outcomes between various groups. However, there is an alternative model of statistical discrimination that demonstrates how between-group wage differentials can arise from imperfect information that firms have about job applicants. Consult Aigner and Cain (1977) , Lundberg and Startz (1983), and Oettinger (1996) for examples of the statistical discrimination model. As O'Neill and O'Neill (2005) have noted, although the nature of discrimination in the statistical discrimination model is drastically different from that in the taste-based model, it is difficult to distinguish between the two models in practice.
who are similar in terms of productivity. Rather, the effect of discrimination at the market level is determined by the transaction between the marginal firm and the marginal minority worker.
An interesting implication of Becker's model is that any discrimination-related wage disparity is likely to be a product of consumer behaviors. As mentioned earlier, there is a real possibility that minority members can largely, if not entirely, avoid firm discrimination. However, if consumers are unwilling to purchase goods and services produced by minorities, then minority workers would not be as valuable to all firms and minority workers would receive lower wages than majority workers as a result. For expository convenience, let's suppose the labor market is competitive. Following the notations introduced earlier, the value of a worker, V, would be equal to P (price of the output produced by the firm) × MP (marginal product of the worker). Suppose consumers prefer to purchase goods and services produced by majority workers. It follows that they would pay a higher price, P = P w , for output produced by majority workers and a lower price, P = P m , for output produced by minorities. As a consequence, two equally productive workers-one majority and one minority-would receive different wages (P w × MP for the white worker and P m × MP for the minority worker), even if there were no prejudicial firms.
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More recent literature shows that both consumer and firm discrimination may lead to wage differentials if the job search is not frictionless. Borjas and Bronars (1989) demonstrate that consumer discrimination would bring about lower mean incomes, as well as negative selection into self-employment among minorities. Sasaki (1999) considers a model where an increase in the degree of coworker discrimination results in lower wages and higher unemployment for the minority group; Rosen (2003) shows that firms with a positive discrimination coefficient would have the highest profit levels and wage equalization does not occur. Given that wage differentials can arise theoretically in a competitive labor market from both consumer and firm discrimination with the 4 Becker's model of discrimination was challenged by Arrow (1973) and Cain (1986) , among others, who argue that it is unlikely for both firm and consumer discrimination to engender wage differentials in a competitive labor market in the long run; instead, discriminatory tastes would manifest themselves as segregation.
introduction of search friction, the pertinent question is then how to quantify the effect of each type of discrimination in order to effectively target enforcement of antidiscriminatory policies.
III. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Suppose there are large numbers of both self-employed and salaried workers within the same industry. Since those who are self-employed would not encounter firm discrimination, any discrimination that is experienced by self-employed workers must have originated from consumers. Salaried workers, on the other hand, may face discrimination that is both employer-and consumer-based. Based on this intuition, we make two claims. First, the difference in earnings between a majority group (denoted as whites) and a minority group (denoted as blacks) among those who are self-employed would account for the impact of consumer discrimination if there were no difference in productivity between self-employed black and white workers. Second, the double difference in earnings would capture the influence of firm discrimination if: (a) the nature of demand for the output provided by self-employed and salaried workers is similar; and (b) there is no difference in productivity between self-employed and salaried workers within each racial group.
We now illustrate the above two claims. Let P s and P n denote the prices that consumers are willing to pay for the output of self-employed and salaried white workers, respectively. Let D c and D f denote the discrimination coefficients of consumers and firms, respectively (both D c and D f < 1). Let MP sw , MP sb , MP nw , and MP nb denote the marginal products produced by self-employed whites, self-employed blacks, salaried whites, and salaried blacks, respectively. In the competitive labor market equilibrium, the wage received by each group of workers would be:
It follows that the difference in the wages received by self-employed whites and self-employed blacks is:
while the difference in the wages received by salaried whites and salaried blacks is:
The double difference in wages is therefore:
It is clear that if black and white workers are equally productive, i.e., MP sw = MP sb , equation (5) reduces to:
If the willingness to pay for the output of self-employed and salaried workers is the same, i.e., P s = P n = P, then equation (7) becomes:
Further, if self-employed and salaried workers are equally productive within each racial group, i.e., MP nw -MP sw = MP nb -MP sb = 0, then equation (8) is simplified to:
IV. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
The above framework is empirically implemented by performing separate BlinderOaxaca decompositions for self-employed and salaried workers while controlling for consumer demand, worker productivity, and other relevant demographic variables. The
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is a standard technique used to divide the wage differential between two groups into a part that is "explained" by differences in observable characteristics and a residual that is "unexplained" by differences in those characteristics. 5 This unexplained part is often regarded as the impact of discrimination on the wage differential.
Given that we need to analyze the wage differentials for both self-employed and salaried physicians, the following OLS wage equations are considered:
In equation (11), ln W is the natural log of wage, X is the set of covariates, and ε is the error term. The covariates include physician's marital status, board certification status, the number of years of experience, experience squared, variables that control for local healthcare market conditions, and a number of dummies that indicate physician's primary medical specialty. For physicians who belong to the same sector (as each physician is either in the self-employment sector or the salary-employment sector), the difference in the expected log wages can be written as follows: (12) consists of two terms. The first term
accounts for the extent of the wage gap due to differences in covariates and is the "explained" part of the differential. On the other hand, the second
represents the component of the wage gap due to differences in coefficients and is referred to as the "unexplained" part of the differential. In the equation for self-employed physicians (i = s), the unexplained part on the right-hand side of (12) would capture the effect of consumer discrimination if productivity can be held constant across racial groups. In order to quantify the impact of firm discrimination, we need to hold consumer demand and worker productivity across different sectors constant and subtract (12) with i = s from (12) with i = n to derive the following:
In equation (13), the term in { } is the difference in the unexplained wage gaps between the salary-employment sector and the self-employment sector-it represents the effect of firm discrimination on the wages of the minority group.
V. DATA AND RESULTS
The data source used to carry out the study is the Young Physicians Survey (YPS). The There were 5,868 respondents in the original wave of the YPS. Among those respondents, 3,124 were reinterviewed in 1991 in the second wave of the survey, which included a total of 6,053 physicians. We first examine the data from the 1987 wave to detect and decompose any possible discrimination in the market for young physicians.
The group of physicians who were interviewed in both 1987 and 1991 were used to assess whether the nature of selection into self-employment differs between black and white physicians.
We restricted the sample used in the estimation to male physicians who worked for at least 20 hours a week, a minimum of 26 weeks in a year, and who earned a wage above the federal minimum wage. The final samples include 2,763 white physicians and 396 black physicians from 1987. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables included in the regression analysis and table 2 reports employment outcomes associated with physicians in various demographic and professional categories. In 1987, the number of average weekly work hours was almost identical for white and black physicians, but blacks had a lower mean income due to a roughly 11% lower hourly wage ($32.12 vs. $35.60 ). This wage differential, however, can be caused by differences in characteristics as the distribution of specialties varies across races and black physicians are less likely to be married, board certified, and practice in high income areas.
Among the nine categories of physician specialties listed, blacks have a greater tendency to specialize in three of them: pediatrics, obstetrics/gynecology, and psychiatry, which are ranked ninth, fourth, and fifth, respectively, in terms of average hourly earnings. Thus, based on summary statistics alone, black physicians seem to have a marginally higher likelihood of being in the less financially lucrative specialties.
Consistent with the general findings on the effect of marital status on male earnings, single male physicians have lower wages and work fewer hours than their married counterparts. The lower probability of being married also contributes to the lower wages earned by black physicians. Surprisingly, the status of board certification appears to have no bearing on one's wage rate. This unexpected result shows that physicians are not penalized, at least from the perspective of contemporaneous monetary compensation, for not being board certified in the beginning stage of their careers. Hence, the substantially lower rate of board certification among the black physicians in the sample does not adversely affect their hourly earnings. However, since blacks and whites have almost identical levels of experience in the sample, the dramatic difference in the rates of board certification (43.7% vs. 74.2%) suggests that there are perhaps differences in unobservable determinants of wages between these two groups if the process of obtaining board certification is not discriminatory against blacks.
The only explanatory variable included in the regression that may lend an advantage to blacks is the physician-to-population ratio. Black physicians tend to practice in areas where the physician-to-population ratio is low. This means that black physicians would, on average, face less competition and their earnings should be higher as a result.
The advantage of less competition enjoyed by black physicians, however, is somewhat, if not entirely, negated by the lower per capita income of their practice locations.
As established in tables 1 and 2, black physicians, in general, have observable characteristics that are less favorable to achieving greater earnings. The magnitudes of these effects on wages are shown in table 3, which entails the estimation results of the wage regressions used in the Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. The most striking result from table 3 is perhaps the size of the experience coefficient for blacks relative to that for whites. 7 At the group mean, wages for black physicians would increase by almost 10.8%
while wages for white physicians would only go up by 8.9%. To the extent of our knowledge, this is the first study that documents higher returns to experience for blacks than for whites. We offer three reasons that can help explain this unique result. Studies in psychology have found that it is common for whites to hold black physicians in high esteems. The rationale for this finding is that when two stereotypes (such as the racial stereotype and the doctor stereotype) are in clash, individuals would only activate the stereotype that confers them the greatest psychological benefit. Hence, if patients more often than not have the motivation to suppress any racial stereotypes they have toward black physicians, it is then more likely for the earnings of black physicians to rise over time.
The status of being married has a positive effect on wages for white physicians who are self-employed, but shows no statistically significant effect on physicians in any other category. Consistent with the summary statistics, board certification has generally no effect on earnings except in the case of salaried black physicians. Within the subgroup of salaried black physicians, the achievement of board certification would raise the hourly wage by about 14%. The coefficients on physician specialties are largely consistent with the findings in table 2. However, it is worth noting that most of those coefficients are insignificant for blacks, as there are few blacks in many of the specialty categories. Finally, the two variables that control for local market conditions (the physician-to-population ratio and per capita income) have either weak or no effects on earnings. As the physicians-to-population ratio increase by 10%, i.e., the number of physicians on a per capita basis decreases by 10%, the hourly wage of self-employed whites would go up by 0.4%, while the hourly wage of salaried blacks would actually decline by 0.6%. If the per capita income in a local area were to rise by 10%, the hourly wage of self-employed blacks would increase by 1.6% and the hourly wage of selfemployed whites would go up by about 0.8%.
The details of the Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions are shown in table 4. The decomposition results suggest that the wage gap among salaried physicians is mostly attributable to differences in covariates, while the wage differential among self-employed physicians is entirely due to differences in coefficients. The portion of the wage gap that can be explained by differences in covariates is actually negative among those who are self-employed. This means that relative to self-employed white physicians, self-employed black physicians, on average, have more characteristics associated with higher earnings.
The size of the unexplained self-employed wage gap of .1134 indicates the magnitude of the black-white wage differential due to consumer discrimination. We can subtract the unexplained gap of .1134 among the self-employed from the unexplained gap of .0179 among the salaried physicians to quantify the magnitude of the wage differential due to firm discrimination. The difference in these two gaps is -.0955. Since salaried workers may suffer from both firm and consumer discrimination, while those who are selfemployed may only be affected by consumer discrimination; the negative difference-indifferences estimate is quite unexpected. However, we should keep in mind that the reliability of the estimates derived from the Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions crucially depends on the conditions of identical demand, equal productivity across employment sectors within each group, and equal productivity across races within the selfemployment sector being satisfied. We attempt to determine if these conditions hold in our sample of physicians in the following section.
VI. ROBUSTNESS TESTS Variations in the Willingness to Pay for Physician Services
Although we control for variables, such as physician-to-population ratios and income per capita, that can potentially affect the general demand for physicians in each local market, there may still be a great deal of variations in the demand for physician services within the same local market. Thus, it is important to ensure that the average demand for selfemployed physicians is not significantly different from that for salaried physicians in the sample. The YPS provides information on the fees charged for office visits and the number of days a new patient has to wait for an appointment. We use these two variables to approximate for the demand for each individual physician. Table 5 however, is minimal (91% vs. 87%). The small difference in the proportions of patients with health insurance coverage between the two groups of physicians is perhaps due to the inability of salaried physicians to choose their own patients. Instead, it is the owners of a practice who determine the composition of its clientele and those employers would also be motivated to pursue patients with health insurance coverage.
The last factor that may lead to systematic variations in the willingness to pay in the healthcare market pertains to the phenomenon of supplier-induced demand. In certain market transactions, suppliers have more knowledge about the usefulness and suitability of the products than demanders and, as a result, demanders rely on suppliers for expert advice in making the purchase decisions. The providers (physicians) in the healthcare market, perhaps more so than suppliers in any other markets, dictate the type of services purchased by the consumers (patients). There is therefore an incentive for physicians to recommend expensive treatment options and this incentive may be greater for selfemployed than salaried physicians whose earnings are likely to be less dependent on services provided. Due to data limitation, we cannot directly test whether there is a difference in the degrees of supplier-induced demand between different types of physicians. However, past studies have shown that the extent of supplier-induced demand in the healthcare industry is insignificant.
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Differentials in Productivity
The status as residual claimants for self-employed physicians not only may result in systematic variations in the consumers' willingness to pay, as previously noted, it may also lead to differences in average productivity between self-employed and salaried physicians. It is possible that those physicians who are willing to devote high levels of effort to work (i.e., physicians who have high productivity conditional on observable characteristics) would find self-employment particularly attractive since they would be able to retain residual revenues as earnings. The YPS provides information on the number of patients seen by a doctor in a week. Combined with the information on the number of hours physicians spend on patient care per week, we can compute the number of patients a physician sees on an hourly basis. If self-employed physicians are indeed more productive than salaried physicians on average, we should perhaps observe a difference in the number of patients seen per hour between these two groups. Table 7 reports the average numbers of patients that self-employed and salaried physicians see in an hour.
Surprisingly, it is the salaried physicians who are about 10% more productive overall (1.91 vs. 1.74 patients per hour). Comparison of physician efficiency is also done for each individual specialty. However, due to a relatively small number of physicians in each specialty, the differentials in productivity are all statistically insignificant other than the case of internal medicine, which happens to be the most popular specialty. Within the category of internal medicine, salaried physicians are approximately 18% more efficient in producing office visits (1.72 vs. 1.46 patients per hour).
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The number of patient visits per hour by employment sector and race are presented in table 8. The group difference in productivity between black and white physicians is not statistically significant and that suggests the estimate of the effect of consumer discrimination is perhaps reliable despite a much lower rate of board certification among black physicians. Among both blacks and whites, salaried physicians see more patients per hour than self-employed physicians; salaried black physicians 8 Rossiter and Wilensky (1984) find that a 10% increase in physician density would raise both utilization and expenditures on physician services by approximately 1%. Stano (1987) argues that the magnitude of the elasticity is even smaller than that. 9 There is a note of caution in equating the number of office visits a physician generates to how efficient that physician is. As recognized by Langwell (1982) , when the number of patient visits in a given time interval is used to proxy for physician efficiency, average quality of the service provided is implicitly assumed to be constant, but that assumption may not be correct in reality. It is possible that self-employed physicians are more inclined to provide a higher average quality office visit by spending more time with each patient as a way of generating repeat customers. Salaried physicians, on the other hand, may have more of an incentive to get patients quickly out of their offices in order to leave work at a reasonable hour. Hence, the greater number of office visits produced in an hour by salaried physicians does not necessarily imply higher productivity.
produce 14% more patient visits than self-employed black physicians, while salaried white physicians generate almost 7% more patient visits than self-employed white physicians, and both differentials are statistically significant. The statistically significant productivity differential within each group seems to have violated one of the (sufficient) conditions for the clear-cut interpretation of the double difference in wage gaps. The larger productivity differential among blacks is consistent with a negative self-selection into self-employment by blacks (relative to whites), as documented by Borjas and Bronars (1989) and Kawaguchi (2005) . If black physicians negatively self-select into self-employment relative to white physicians, the double difference in wage gaps would understate the effect of firm discrimination, as can be clearly seen from equation (9).
We exploit the longitudinal element of the YPS to further investigate the issue of negative selection into self-employment among black physicians. After applying various sample restrictions, there are 1,470 black or white male physicians who have valid employment and wage data in both the 1987 and 1991 surveys. Table 9 Among blacks who were employees of healthcare providers in 1987, those who switched to self-employment in 1991 had a 5% lower average wage in 1987 than those who remained as employees. The difference of 5%, however, is not statistically significant.
Among whites who were salaried physicians in 1987, the ones who moved to the selfemployment sector had a 7% higher wage in 1987 than the ones who did not make the move. Among the physicians who were self-employed in 1987, no statistically significant relationships can be found between the average wage of sector switchers and that of nonswitchers within either blacks or whites. Considering all the evidence, black physicians seem to exhibit a negative selection into self-employment relative to white physicians.
VII. CONCLUSION
A difference-in-differences strategy is proposed in this paper to decompose the contributions of different types of discrimination to the black-white wage differential.
The strategy is based on the intuition that self-employed individuals are not likely to be subject to firm discrimination, while salaried workers may suffer from both firm and consumer discrimination. Hence, after controlling for all the characteristics that can potentially affect earnings, the wage difference between self-employed black and white workers can be attributed to consumer discrimination, while the wage difference between salaried black and white workers in excess of the difference between self-employed black and white workers is attributable to firm discrimination.
The sufficient conditions under which the difference and double difference estimates would accurately reflect the distinct effects of consumer and firm discrimination on earnings are derived in a general framework. In order for the wage difference between self-employed black and white workers to correctly measure the effect of consumer discrimination, these two groups of workers must be equally productive. The difference-in-differences estimate would precisely indicate the fraction of the racial wage gap that results from firm discrimination if consumer's willingness to pay is identical for both self-employed and salaried workers, and if self-employed and salaried workers are equally productive within each racial group.
Data from the Young Physicians Survey is used to implement the proposed strategy. The results suggest that potential discrimination plays a small role in the racial wage gap among physicians. At most, discrimination lowers the hourly wages of black physicians by 3.3%. The decompositions show that consumer discrimination accounts for all of the potential discrimination in the physician market and that the effect of firm discrimination is actually in favor of black physicians. The interpretations of the estimates, however, are complicated by the possibility that relative to white physicians, black physicians negatively self-select into self-employment. This relative negative selection into self-employment by blacks would both overestimate the effect of consumer discrimination and underestimate the effect of firm discrimination. (2005), we estimate the "normalized" wage regressions. Hence, the coefficient on each physician specialty expresses the wage deviation in percentages from the mean of all specialties. 
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